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Abstract
Contemporary comics studies criticism largely approaches comics from a literary
framework. While this may be one valid method of understanding the comics medium, it fails to
offer a complete understanding of the nature of comics as a hybrid medium composed of both
text and image. Moreover, several common theses in comics studies—the gutter as a signifying
absence, the spatialization of time on the page, and the image’s operation as a sort of visual
language—unintentionally enforce onto comics linguistic and temporal philosophies not
necessarily inherent to the medium. Operating from this belief, the present project aims to
explore what the author terms an aesthetics of comics. Through a variety of comics texts
spanning genre and history, this essay explores an alternative theory for understanding nature of
the text and image in comics and how they operate together and relate to one another in this
hybrid medium.
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Remarks on the Purpose and Structure of this Essay
This essay does not aim to outline a history of comics but to explore certain concepts that
are unique to comics, but which can only be conceived philosophically. These concepts are
neither wholly technical, e.g. the mechanics of inking, nor critical, e.g. problems of biographical
representation. Nor are these concepts primarily linguistic. Indeed, this essay positions itself
against the antagonistic theses that comics are either are a language or that they employ a visual
language. Nor does this essay concern the pure semiotics or narratology of comic art. Rather the
present essay seeks to explore the nature of comics as a text-image hybrid through the
“ontological” nature of its constituent parts. One may perhaps thus understand this essay as
aiming towards an aesthetics of comics.
Being primarily concerned with philosophical concepts unique and inherent to comics,
this essay will make use of a wide range of comic texts spanning genre, form, and culture, with
an extended analysis of Art Spiegelman’s Maus given its canonical status in contemporary
comics studies. My primary philosophical interest will center on the nature of the comics image
and its concomitant temporality, although other issues will be touched upon, indicating potential
for further study. The present essay’s purpose is explorative: it aims to examine comics and
comics criticism for the potentiality of developing a complete comics aesthetics and thereby lay
the foundational and preliminary work towards that end. As such, my ultimate goal is admittedly
grander than the requirements of this essay necessitate, but with that in mind, this essay intends
to provide the foundation for a larger project.
With this in mind, the essay will begin with a critical overview of contemporary comics
studies, raising and fleshing out several objections along the way. After this overview and
commentary on the theoretical landscape, the essay will move to analyze Spiegelman’s Maus in
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light of the objections raised during the critical overview. Several other comics text will also be
discussed in brief, such as Peer Meter and Barbara Yelin’s Gift and the 1986 Marvel graphic
novel Doctor Strange: Into Shamballa. Following these focused analyses of comics, the essay
will conclude with some remarks on its own limitations and subsequent plans for further study.
Stephen Hawking once remarked, in summary, that the professional trend towards
specialization is a natural result of the digital age—fields of study progress with such speed
nowadays that keeping up with the continuous stream of developments necessitates the scholar’s
undivided attention. Though Hawking was then speaking of physics, the remark remains no less
true of comics studies. Of course, the natural limitations involved in creating a Master’s thesis—
such as the naïveté that accompanies one’s first encounter with the critical landscape or the time
restrictions surrounding such a project—only make keeping up with a given field’s incessant
theoretical and critical developments all the more difficult.
Rather than being a plea for leniency, this digression serves as a warning for any reader
well versed in contemporary comics studies. (S)He will find that some recent critical or
theoretical works go unmentioned throughout this essay, e.g. Simon Grennan’s recent A Theory
of Narrative Drawing. Although such works must undoubtedly be discussed should research be
carried further, they have been neglected here so as to keep in line with the present project’s
focused scope. Unfortunately, such a focused and limited project as the Master’s thesis cannot
hope to engage every aspect of the critical and theoretical landscape, especially while aiming to
explore the uncharted areas of that landscape as does this essay. But that is enough for now. I
will return to this project’s shortcomings and potential for further research in my concluding
section.
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Given the philosophical orientation of this project, much of the following essay will
appear superficially foreign to the mass of comics scholarship, being concerned neither with
narratological nor reader-oriented analyses. Rather, as mentioned prior, it seeks to outline what
can be understood as the unique aesthetic of comics as a text-image hybrid, and by extension, the
nature of those two parts. In a sense, then, much of what follows will oppose the inherent and
latent dogmatics, or what have approached the status of common-sense assumptions, in literary
comics studies, as such impose a conception of the world and space-time onto comics rather than
realizing comics’ own conception of the world.
Although this exploration shifts the critical discussion outside of its predominant literary
framework by paving the way for an aesthetic and philosophical interpretation of comics, the
shift, I hope, will provide new room for growth by pruning the contemporary scholarship, so to
speak. Literary comics scholarship these days is interested in defining comics, as though the
medium had a checklist of measurable requisites that any art object must meet in order to be
knighted a “comic.” I personally find this a vain pursuit. Due to the seemingly unending list of
exceptions to every thinkable parameter that the theorist must consider, the resulting definition
winds up too ambiguous to be of worth and functionally no different than having no definition
whatsoever. It is as useless as attempting to list the qualities that differentiate poetry from prose.
This is something Neil Cohn, cognitive scientist at Tilburg University, suggests on the
first page of the first chapter of his book The Visual Language of Comics when he writes,
“language is a human behavior while comics are not. Comics are social objects created by
incorporating the results of two human behaviors: writing and drawing” (1, emphasis in
original). As he continues, “Ultimately, the definition of comics includes a network of ideas
composed of their subject matter, format, readership, history, industry, the specific visual
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languages they use, and other cultural characteristics” (2). From this, I suggest that comics
cannot be defined solely by their structural properties, but are instead defined by a pre-rational
societal consciousness. Society determines what is a comic and what is not. The answer to
W.J.T. Mitchell’s frank question, “What the @#&!* is comics?” (256), may then be: we know it
when we see it.
An Overview and Revision of the Theoretical Landscape
One structural feature of comics that literary critics remain generally in agreement over is
how comics, through “two narrative tracks, one verbal and one visual, register temporality
spatially” (Chute, “Literature” 452), making it a form that “relies on space to represent time”
(456). This is an idea common among many cartoonist-theorists, Scott McCloud and Art
Spiegelman being two such individuals. While rightfully recognizing comics’ relationship
between space and time, proposing that comics “spatialize time” builds from a pre-Einsteinian
division between space and time as separate entities. Theorists, then, may not push the spacetime relationship in comics far enough. Much like Einstein’s theory of relativity, perhaps comics
conflate both space and time into one space-time. It is not that they spatialize time, but rather
visualize a spatio-temporality that contradicts the human experience of temporal flow but fits
contemporary developments in the field of quantum mechanics.
There are, of course, those who oppose the idea of comics’ spatialization of time. For
instance, according to Neil Cohn, in this theory, “the properties of space and time being
compared exist on two entirely separate planes of analysis. While the space McCloud refers to is
based on physical distance, the sense of time he refers to is entirely a mental construct” (“Limits”
131). In support of this critique, Hannah Miodrag suggests the space-equals-time thesis conflates
two distinct narratological temporalities. As she explains, narratology understands two sorts of
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duration, narrative duration and fictional duration, and “the direct equation of the two assumed
by the theory of temporal mapping is high questionable” (118).

Fig. 1 Will Eisner, A Contract With God, W.W. Norton and Company,
2006, p. 134
5

But comics’ supposed spatialization of time rests on the panel-as-moment thesis, which
in turn has traditionally connected itself to the conceptualization of the gutter as a signifying site
of absence that represents all of the moments from a stream of action never illustrated in the
panels. At least in the Anglophone school of comics studies, Scott McCloud may be credited
with having first developed this idea, or at least popularizing it. In his 1993 book Understanding
Comics, McCloud defined the gutter as “that space between the panels” (66), and that skeletal
definition has gone unchallenged to this day. For instance, in her own narratological analysis of
comics, Barbara Postema writes, “Gutters are the empty spaces between panels” (49); Duncan et
al. writes that comic panels are “usually separated by a white space known as the gutter” (109,
emphasis in original). Such spatialized terminology perpetuates a misunderstanding of the gutter
as an entity in itself. But obvious difficulties arise when one considers instances such as inset
panels and polygraphic panels that have no tangible space between images, being separated by
only the panel’s frame or not at all. One may consider, for example, a page from Will Eisner’s A
Contract with God (Fig. 1). In this image, there are no blank spaces between images and no
panel frames. Instead the smoke, itself part of the image, seems to fill these traditional roles. The
reader can of course suggest that such sequential instances are gutter-less, but such a proposition
creates problems for theorists like McCloud and Postema, the latter of whom claims, “The gutter
is necessary to signify sequentiality” (49). Though never overtly professing this, McCloud seems
in agreement as he locates the imagined connection between juxtaposed images inside this blank
space.
This McCloudian conceptualization of the gutter resonates with Walter Benjamin’s idea
of apogee in lived experience when he writes, “If sleep is the apogee of physical relaxation,
boredom is the apogee of mental relaxation. Boredom is the dream bird that hatches the egg of
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experience” (91). Eric Berlatsky summarizes McCloud by claiming “action is evoked in the
space between frames” (174, emphasis in original). For McCloud, each frame depicts an isolated
moment in time, and the juxtaposition of these two plus moments forces the reader to fill in the
resulting gap. With this locatable blank space between panels, the reader’s imagination freely
works, and so becomes responsible for the action (McCloud 66-9). The gutter thus becomes a
vacant space for the imagination much like boredom and sleep are for Benjamin. Within the
gutter, the comics reader imagines alternate realities and connections, and different readers
visualize the action within the gap differently. For McCloud, the gap in comics, reflective of the
gaps in life for Benjamin, becomes the realm of (re)interpretation and (re)visualization.
McCloud’s notion of the gap-as-apogee approaches the medium from a reader-centric
perspective. His understanding that “comics panels fracture both time and space, offering a
jagged, staccato rhythm of unconnected moments” from which the reader must “mentally
construct a continuous, unified reality” (67) springs from his prior remarks on the phenomenon
of “closure” in lived experience. For McCloud, closure involves “mentally completing that
which is incomplete based on past experience” and can be understood as “observing the parts but
perceiving the whole” (63). Within this theoretical framework, comics offer a series of isolated
moments that the reader uses as imaginative springboards to mentally construct a continuous
stream of action. The difference between that which is manifest on the comics page and that
which the reader imagines in order to read becomes analogous to the difference between a filmic
storyboard and the final film itself.
Of course, this forces a filmic and experiential understanding of time and reality onto a
wholly different medium. Though I am by no means the first to recognize this filmic
interpretation of comics (Christiansen 117). As Kia Mikkonen writes, “One persistent trend in
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comics theory, though less common today, has been to see comics as ‘frozen’ and ‘immobile’
form of cinema, or a kind of storyboard for a film that consequently does not require a poetics of
its own” (13). But why must time (and space) be filled with continuity? Humans experience time
as a stream of flowing action, much like in film, but as any post-Kantian philosopher may
remark, human experience and perception does not necessarily testify to the world’s actuality.
Further, by enforcing this filmic and human experiential sense of time onto comics, temporal
mapping, with its concomitant gutter-as-absence thesis, ignores the possibility that comics may
offer a wholly alternative understanding of space-time than that experienced by humans. This is
McCloud’s cardinal sin. He assumes comics select moments from a stream of action and that the
reader will then mentally reconnect these moments into a stream that resonates with lived
experience. His implicit concern becomes how the reader constructs meaning from the comics
sequence, and a crucial starting point for his theoretical framework becomes a spatial rhetoric of
the gutter as a manifest site of absence on the page. This approach unintentionally refuses to take
comics on their own terms.
At first glance, Thierry Groensteen seems to stray from this ideological conceptualization
of the gutter as a locatable blank space on the page. For him, the gutter “lends itself
metaphorically,” being but “the symbolic site” of absence—“more than a zone on the paper, it is
the interior screen on which every reader projects the missing image (or images)” (System 1123). Groensteen thus develops a less rhetorically spatial theory of the gutter than McCloud, but
one that he implicitly annuls in a later book when he alludes to the gutter as “the blank space that
separates [two images]” (Narration 39).
Scholars such as Barbara Postema and Hillary Chute follow Scott McCloud’s original
thesis of the gutter as a blank space in which the reader’s imagination conceives, in Benjaminian
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fashion, the virtual instants of space-time between two panels on the page. Groensteen agrees yet
disagrees with this conceptualization of the gutter when he writes of the gutter as “not the seat of
a virtual image; it is the site of a semantic articulation, a logical conversion, that of a series of
utterables (the panels) in a statement that is unique and coherent (the story)” (System 114).
Although rejecting the gutter as a space representing virtual instances of space-time connecting
panels, Groensteen retains a conceptualization of the gutter as a space in which meaning is
produced, treating the gutter as a signifying absence between panels. In other words, for
Groensteen, the gutter need not be manifest on the page, yet it still functions as a
(metaphorically) empty space in which the reader’s imagination visualizes moments and
connections not represented. Roy Bearden-White follows this logic when he interprets the gutter
as simply one of many gaps within the comics medium, “whether between text and image or
between panels” (347). It is an absence that the reader’s imagination fills in with non-visualized
moments and meaning.
Before proceeding, I want to address an objection the reader may raise in response to my
critical overview of this theory of the gutter: am I not taking too literally the spatial rhetoric
employed throughout criticism in describing the gutter’s function? This is a legitimate objection.
For despite their spatialized terminology, critics such as Postema and Groensteen suggest an
understanding of the gutter as more a metaphorical site of absence rather than a locatable
vacuum on the physical page. But I have hitherto raised a hubbub over their terminology because
their rhetoric belies whatever their theoretical position may be by latently perpetuating a
misconception of the gutter and, by extension, the inherent logic of comics.
In contrast to this spatialization of the gutter, I want to start, yet move away, from
Groensteen’s conceptualization of the gutter as a symbolic site of absence. I start here, as
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Groensteen has moved away from the gutter as an entity on the page. Yet I wish to move away
from this as it still conceives of the gutter as a signifying absence, an entity in itself. It is
commonly accepted that comics spatialize time on the page. If each image thus operates as an
isolated block of space-time conceptually closed off from all the others, one wonders what
exactly separates one image from another. At first glance, each panel’s border would seem to
isolate it from the other panels. Is this not the typical function of lines, to divide and close off, to
separate entities and spaces from one another? The English expression of drawing a line in the
sand rests upon this logic. But a common technique in comics involves the abandonment of the
panel’s frame, its lines of enclosure, altogether. This simple abandonment of the frame creates
difficulties regarding difference, temporality, and spatiality.

Fig. 2 Bill Watterson, The Complete Calvin and Hobbes, Book One, Andrews McMeel
Publishing, 2005, p. 226
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One of Bill Watterson’s Calvin and Hobbes Sunday strips (Fig. 2) offers an excellent
opportunity for an analysis of these issues. In the strip, Calvin and his imaginary tiger Hobbes
dance to a vinyl record while Calvin’s parents try to sleep. The strip’s dance sequence consists of
a continuous, un-bordered collection of images that depict Calvin and Hobbes in intermittent
dance poses. Without any physical frame separating poses, the question arises whether this strip
depicts both Calvin and Hobbes at various moments in a stream of continuous time or whether a
multitude of blonde ten-year-olds and imaginary tigers have materialized at the onset of a
musical score. Common sense suggests the first.
A critical analysis of this strip would certainly make note of the artistic effect resulting
from Watterson’s abjurement of panel frames—how Calvin and Hobbes’ dancing flows in the
reader’s mind, how the lack of frames induces a sensation of continuous movement mimicking
the real-time act of dancing. But a more philosophical question arises in relation to the elements
of graphic narrative. Without a frame to separate these supposed isolated instants of space-time
in the graphic sequence, the instants bleed into one another, melding into a flow of ostensibly
static representations. Simultaneously, without the frame to distinguish panels from one another,
the gutter as a manifest site of absence disappears altogether. Yet any reader will recognize that
each boy drawn in this Calvin and Hobbes strip is in fact the same boy at different positions in
his dance. Even without the visible gutter and panel frame, readers thus recognize a relation of
difference between depictions. I posit, contra previous comics scholarship, that the gutter exists
as this relation of difference between images. It is neither a literal nor metaphorical space of
signifying absence, but as simply the relation of difference between images.
The cited Calvin and Hobbes strip exemplifies this understanding of the gutter through its
abandonment of distinguishable frames. By removing panel frames in the strip’s dance sequence,
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Watterson likewise eschews the gutter as a visible entity of absence on the page. Even were one
to remove the first and final enclosed panels, the sequence would remain clear despite its lack of
text to anchor and produce informational meaning. The gutter, rather than being a signifying
absence which produces meaning or harbors virtual images, exists as the relation of pure
difference. In this way, the gutter does not exist in itself, and so cannot be a metaphoric site of
absence or visualized blank space on the page. The gutter does not stand-in for anything, as
Postema infers in describing it as “an elision, or an omission even” (62). Rather, the gutter exists
as the relation of the difference between two juxtaposed images. Returning to our example, the
gutter is the difference between one representation of Calvin dancing and another.
Groensteen writes:
The comics image, whose meaning often remains open when it is presented as
isolated (and without verbal anchorage), finds its truth in the sequence. Inversely,
the gutter, insignificant in itself, is invested with an arthrologic function that can
only be deciphered in light of the singular image that it separates and unites.
(System 114)
A crucial error lurks in the subtext of this passage when Groensteen describes the gutter as
“insignificant in itself,” as he thereby infers the gutter could exist or have any significance on its
own without two or more juxtaposed images. For the descriptive “insignificant in itself” to mean
anything, the body in question must be capable of existing apart by itself, otherwise the
designation loses all meaning. But the gutter only exists in light of images in sequence. This is
the risk involved in speaking of the gutter as a blank space, a site of absence, a signifying
negativity between images—such spatial rhetoric and imaginative figuration of the gutter as a
form of elision tacitly pushes the gutter into an existence independent of the graphic sequence.
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The gutter, however, does not exist apart from the graphic sequence. No one speaks of
the gutter involved in a single image comic, e.g. Family Circus or Farside. A gap may reside
between the text and image, but no theorist or reader ever refers to this gap as the gutter. The
gutter, then, can be understood as the collectively determined designation for the gap that comes
into existence only when a minimum of two images are placed in sequence. Once placed
together, a relation of pure difference immediately emerges between these images, even if that
difference is nothing other than their position on the page or in the book. As Mikkonen
admonishes, then, “we must recognize the importance of the panel relation, not the space in
between” (40).
Of course, if the gutter is nothing but the gap of difference between two disconnected
images, a question of continuity arises. The gutter as difference becomes a relation of separation
between two images. But what allows these images to be perceived as together in a comic?
What connects them into a cohesive whole? What is the connective link between panels that
allows them to become sequences, pages, and whole books? Traditionally, the gutter as a site of
absence filled this function by representing the connective moments between static images. But
if the gutter is nothing save the relation of difference, what allows a continuous relation to be
established between panels? Do not relations of difference only divide?
Like the gutter, the connective link between panels arises only and always when panels
are placed together, for then the panels are understood as in sequence. This expression is a
misnomer, as bodies are not placed inside of a sequence, as though the sequence were a locative
zone into which thoughts or objects or, more pertinent to this essay, comic panels could be
situated. Rather, sequences result from the arrangement of bodies alongside one another, though
this arrangement need not be intentional. Rocks can be lined on a beach by the rise and sink of
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tidal flow, but this mere arrangement does not infer a sequence, which itself only appears when a
mind imposes on the arrangement a relation of meaning. Seeing the rocks arranged beside one
another on the beach, the mind recognizes some relation of difference and repetition between the
arranged bodies and thereby conceives of them as a sequence. For instance, a woman walking
along the shore may notice that the rocks happen to have been aligned by the tide from largest to
smallest due to some natural laws of physics. She may then remark, “The tide has arranged these
rocks in sequence based on size.” But this is not true. The tide has merely pushed rocks onto the
shore, their arrangement being the product of unintentional laws of physics. It is the observer
who has imposed a relational order, i.e. sequence, onto the arrangement. Sequence, then, does
not exist apart from the mind, and then only as a complex structure, being the arrangement of
independent bodies situated beside one another.
In this way, it becomes clear that a conglomeration of panels brought together produces
the sequence; it is not a singular form, but meaning-filled plurality-as-oneness imposed upon and
arising from a series of images. Once these two plus images are set next to one another, a relation
of pure difference immediately results and this relation becomes the establishing link that allows
the panels to be described as in sequence. To recognize any relation is to recognize a connection,
even if that connection is one of difference. In this way, the panels become connected by the
very difference that distinguishes them. This connection produces an overarching sense of
meaning that imposes itself onto the two plus images, allowing them to be grouped as a sequence
or multiframe.
Before progressing, it is necessary to address what I consider Groensteen’s arbitrary
designation between a sequence and a series. In discussing abstract comics, such as those by
Derik Badman or Ilan Moulonch, Groensteen writes of abstract, i.e. non-narrative (cf. Baetans,

14

“Abstraction”), comics images arranged together: “They establish relationships of position,
congruity, intensity, repetition, variation, or contrast, as well as dynamic relationships of rhythm,
interwovenness, etc. In principle, nothing in this list pertains to narration, which is why I alluded
above to a series, rather than a sequence, of drawings” (Groensteen, Narration 12, emphasis in
original). In an earlier work, he writes how “once images present a rapport of transformation
between them, they constitute at the very minimum a series (the minimum being only two
images) but not necessarily a narrative sequence” (System 106, emphasis in original). From these
two passages, it seems obvious that Groensteen conflates ideas of narration and sequentiality. He
would do better in the latter quote to italicize narrative rather than sequence, as that is really what
he seems to mean by the term series, a non-narrative sequence.
McCloud, by contrast, avoids falling into this arbitrary distinction primarily via his
concept of the non-sequitur transition between panels, as for him, this transition creates a wholly
non-narrative sequence from a collection of seemingly unrelated panels (72). This mention of
McCloud is important, for McCloud’s description of sequence resonates with my own above
description of the sequence as an overarching affective or narrative meaning enforced on the
panels while resulting from the relation of difference between them. Nonetheless, there remain
important distinctions between them. To elaborate on these differences, I will quote McCloud at
length:
No matter how dissimilar one image may be to another, there is a kind of alchemy
at work in the space between panels which can help us find meaning or resonance
in even the most jarring of combinations. Such transitions may not make “sense”
in any traditional way, but still a relationship of some sort will inevitably develop.
By creating a sequence with two or more images, we are endowing them with a
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single overriding identity, and forcing the viewer to consider them as a whole.
(73)
While a superficial similarity exists between McCloud’s figuration of the sequence here and my
own, there remain crucial differences between them. For instance, McCloud refers to the space
between panels, i.e. the gutter, as an agent aiding the reader in constructing meaning between
two juxtaposed images. But I understand the gutter as a relation of difference between panels,
and being nothing save this relation of difference, the gutter does not aid the reader in
constructing meaning, but instead forces the reader to recognize and create the narrative,
informational, or affective meaning over the images. If the several images are situated next to
one another, there will be multiple relations of difference, and so a plurality of connections from
which the reader will construct the ultimate meaning. This meaning can be thematic, narrative,
and so on. This meaning is what established the collection of panels as a sequence.
This explication highlights my other primary difference from McCloud, that is, his claim
that a relationship between panels eventually and inevitably develops. His terminology suggests
that panels could, at some point in time, exist without a relationship to one another. This is
impossible in comics, at least so I contend, as the relationship between juxtaposed panels is
always already there at the moment two or more panels are set side by side. For every reader, a
relationship always already exists between two juxtaposed images, and it is a relation of
difference. In the face of this disruptive difference, the reader becomes compelled to find some
sort of connection between the images—dialogue often fills this role of overtly connecting two
plus panels. Once this connection has been established between images, the reader develops an
overriding sense of meaning that (s)he projects onto the collection, and it is this endowment of
an overarching relation of meaning upon the image collection that constitutes their formation
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into a sequence. From this, we can define the graphic sequence in comics as a collection of
juxtaposed images, i.e. panels, with a single encompassing meaning attributed by the reader.
Thus the sequence is a cognitive attribution of (not necessarily narrative) meaning onto a group
of images.
Two points have thus far been discussed at length: 1) the gutter does not exist
independently of panels as a blank space which brings forth meaning or signifies virtual images,
but is in fact the relation of pure difference between images that always and necessarily exists at
the moment of their juxtaposition, and 2) the sequence is a cognitive attribution of meaning
arising from and imposed upon a collection images in order to reconcile the relations of pure
difference between images in the reader’s mind. In short, nothing exists in comics outside of the
image and text. There are only these two, and everything else—the gutter, the sequence, the
frame—emerges as the relation between images or between text and image.
This is not to argue, as Postema does, that “panels in comics should be seen
syntagmatically, as units creating a larger structure” (xvii). This would be to fall into an
erroneous ontological structure by conceiving the comic as made of simple and complex objects,
image and text being the most fundamental with sequences, page layouts, and books becoming
increasingly complex structures. Instead, to say that there is only the image and text means that
the gutter and sequence, or layout and book, are nothing but descriptors for the myriad ways
these two objects interact. Neither the panel nor the text is the most fundamental object of a
comic; they are, in fact, the only objects. Everything else is but their interactions. This important
distinction enacts a shift in the locus of comics away from the idea of a gap, i.e. lack (Postema
xx), as traditionally embodied in the gutter, towards what is actually portrayed on the page—a
signifying shift from the negative to positive.
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But if the focus shifts to what is present on the page, the question arises concerning the
nature of what is present on the page. What is the nature of the image and text in comics and how
do they interact? To seek an answer to this question, I will turn to Art Spiegelman’s Maus with
an attention to several other comics. I will largely discuss the nature of the image and its function
in the comic, but in doing so, I hope to thereby explore the nature of the text as well.
On the Nature of the Text and Image
If one were to compile a canon for comics and graphic narratives, Maus would
undoubtedly be included. In any academic discussion of graphic narratives, Maus looms large.
Simultaneously, Art Spiegelman’s philosophy of comics has had no small influence on
contemporary comics criticism. For instance, in the following digression, he voices a taken-forgranted assumption by comics scholars:
Comics, in their essence, are about time being made manifest spatially, in that
you’ve got all these different chunks of time—each box being a different moment
of time—and you seem them all at once. As a result you’re always, in comics,
being made aware of different times inhabiting the same space. (qtd. in Silverblatt
35)
Comics’ spatialization of time, with its concomitant non-linearity, has become a staple of works
by comics scholars such as Hillary Chute, Thierry Groensteen, Scott McCloud, Charles Hatfield,
and so forth. In fact, scholars often quote Spiegelman on this conception of temporality in re
comics. This is especially true about literary criticism of Spiegelman’s own Maus. Nearly every,
if not every, analysis of Maus approaches the text from this conception of comics—that each box
represents one moment of time mapped among others onto the page, and thereby flouting the
parameters of linear time.
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While this approach is not necessarily wrong, a danger lies in its ubiquity. That well nigh
every comics scholar has addressed Maus this way has prompted far-reaching claims from
otherwise intelligent minds. For instance, in a seminal essay for PMLA, Hillary Chute examines
what she believes “inclines comics to autobiography, biography, and other modes of life writing”
(“Comics Form” 107). What precisely inclines comics so? According to Chute, it is that comics
are “a form that fundamentally relies on space to represent time, carving punctual moments out
of the space of the page. Comics locates the reader in space and for this reason is able to
spatialize memory” (108). Here Chute suggests that the spatialization of time via the
arrangement of punctual moments, i.e. panels, across the page makes comics a preferred medium
for representing what she calls life writing.
This relates to a statement in one of her more recent books: “The grammar of comics,
across all of its formats, shapes time and space; it suggests that one encounter the panel as an
event, and it presents a non-linear experience of time” (Disaster 157). Of course, Chute here
approaches comics from a wider theoretical framework originated by Scott McCloud, as do
Spiegelman and most American critics. But for precisely this reason, we would do well to stop
and check our bearings. Is this a valid theory of comics? If so, is it the only one? After all, it is
this theoretical background that seems to undergird Chute’s whole proposition that comics
incline themselves towards biographical works.
Thus, I here approach Maus from an alternative theoretical framework that I have
attempted to outline in this essay’s previous section. Given her wide body of work and
representative status concerning (auto)biographical graphic narratives, I will largely address
Hillary Chute’s criticism of Maus, while also making use of other scholars’ work. My concern is
not with Hillary Chute, however, but rather with the taken-for-granted theoretical framework
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within which so many in the American school of comics studies operate. Of course, as explained
in the introduction, I am not the only one to challenge this comics theory, although I do believe
my own investigation will yield novel results for consideration. For clarity, I have boiled this
Chute-McCloudian interpretation of Maus down to two main tenets:
1) the panel is an event, a bloc of space-time, interrupted by intervals of unrepresented
time, i.e. the gutter
2) via the arrangement of panels, comics spatialize time onto the page, disrupting the
popular conception of linear time
These are the two points that my own theory works against. I hope to show what an alternative
theoretical framework, when applied to Maus, can offer for understanding comics.
Let us begin with the image, that fundamental object of the comics form. Like many
readers of Maus, J. Hillis Miller finds three distinct yet interwoven narratives comprising Maus:
Vladek’s Holocaust narrative, the narrative of Art’s interviewing Vladek, and the narrative of
Art’s telling those narratives. He describes the narrative layers as “made of discontinuous
episodic blocks” (173). This episodic interpretation of the comics sequence reappears when
Hillary Chute writes, “Comics takes shape through intervals, including the gutter, its central,
constitutive interval of absence” (179). The notion of episodes or intervals so common
throughout comics discourse testifies to the assumed understanding of time outlined in the
introduction, that comics portray static instants from a largely non-representational stream of
action, whose gaps are meant to be filled by the reader. But this enforces a human experiential
and filmic understanding of time onto comics rather than taking comics on their own terms.
As Kai Mikkonen remarks, “panels are not so much moments as they may be perceptions,
perspectives, thoughts, ideas, or representative scenes of action” (55). In this way, Chute is right

20

to emphasize the similitude between comics and memories, although not in the sense that comic
panels are blocks of time mapped onto the page. Rather, the panel operates like memory as a
percept. Gilles Deleuze writes of the art object as “a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a
compound of percepts and affects” (164, emphasis in original). He goes on to write, “the aim of
art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to
wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another” (167). In other words,
art does not aim to create the clinical representation of an object or scene of action, but rather the
emotional experience, distilled percepts and affects, that are felt by/of that object or in that
instant.
Hillary Chute interestingly approaches this idea, albeit in different terms when she writes,
“The distilled register of the cartoon and the drawn line creates an enveloping, idiosyncratic
world of expression that can be powerful for witness … One person’s line can create what feels
like a secret world of experience” (Disaster 168). In comparison, Deleuze writes, “every work of
art is a monument, but here the monument is not something commemorating a past, it is a bloc of
present sensations that owe their preservation only to themselves and that provide the event with
the compound that celebrates it” (167-8, emphasis in original). The difference between these
statements is subtle but distinctive. For Chute, comic art creates a world of experience; for
Deleuze, the experience of an experience is inherent to the art (read: comic) object.1
The difference may be clarified by turning more directly now to Maus. In a Deleuzian
aesthetics, Spiegelman does not create a perception of Auschwitz, but Auschwitz as percept.
“The percept is the landscape before man, in the absence of man” (169). Of course, how can we
say this, specifically of Auschwitz, since the “landscape is not independent of the supposed
1

Deleuze never speaks of comics in his essay, but he includes all other art forms. Given this all-encompassing
scope, it seems reasonable to include comics in this theory given their wider acceptance among both mainstream and
academic cultures nowadays.
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perceptions of the characters, and through them, of the author’s perceptions and memoires?”
(169). Deleuze answers that we can because “Characters can only exist, and the author can only
create them, because they do not perceive but have passed into the landscape and are themselves
part of the compound of sensations” (169). In Maus, then, we do not see Vladek’s experience of
the Shoah, but his becoming-Shoah, to echo Deleuze’s terminology; Vladek can perceive the
Holocaust because he has passed into it and become imperceptible in himself; he is a part of the
Holocaust—an admittedly haunting thought. This is because “We are not in the world, we
become with the world; we become by contemplating it” (169).
This does not mean “the rest of the drawn world [is] effectively an extension of the
character,” as Harry Morgan draws from Rudolph Töpffer (Morgan 33). Rather the character has
passed into the landscape—this is what the necessarily caricatured nature of comics illustrates,
that the two become inseparable in art. In Maus, Vladek cannot be taken out of the Holocaust,
just as Art cannot be taken out of his relationship with his father. The subject, e.g. Vladek or Art,
cannot be taken out of the landscape or relationship, in other words, their context, for they have
passed into it. We do not see Vladek’s perception of the Holocaust, nor Art’s perception of that
perception. Instead, Maus, being a work of art, raises these subjective perceptions to percepts,
the pure sensation in itself existing apart from humanity.
In this light, both Chute and Spiegelman are right to see “comics panels as boxes of
memory smashing up against each other” (Disaster 194), although not in the representational
sense Chute describes. Memories are perceptions and affections. The emotional experience of
remembering a given moment is an intrinsic part of that memory; to change the emotion
associated with a given memory is to fundamentally alter that memory—it no longer remains the
same memory. The memory-boxes of which Spiegelman speaks do not represent the actuality of
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the remembered event or one’s experience of it, but manifest the perception and affection that
constitute a given memory. This is not the same division Hillary Chute addresses when she
claims “comics calls into question the status of any ‘objective’ or ‘realistic’ account, including
historiographies” (198-9), a claim that coincides with Douglas Wolk’s declaration that comics
are not about what the artist has seen but rather what the event means to him/her (Wolk 21). The
comic-as-percept-affect thesis is not about this juxtaposition between objective and subjective
representations of history, but a stance against the idea of the image as mere representation in the
first place.

Fig. 3 Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale I: My Father Bleeds History,
Pantheon, 1989, p. 85
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The memory-boxes do not represent memories but manifest the perception-affections that
comprise memory. They are more than blocks of space-time as the traditional McCloudian
theory of comics understands; they simultaneously exist as blocs of sensation. This, in turn, lends
a new dimension to the notion that comics spatialize time onto the page. In narrative comics, this
spatialized temporality is often thought of as a causal chain of events, one moment leads to
another, thereby drawing from the everyday human experience of temporal flow. But the still
image does not imagine time in this fashion, and neither does memory. Memories are not
sequential streams; we do not remember events like film. A memory is rather seemingly static,
an instant, a smell, a noise, a singular contained thing melded with emotion, thereby becoming a
bloc of sensations for the one who remembers. Likewise, contrary to the panel-as-moment thesis
or the belief that “single panels in comics frequently represent duration, a span of time, instead of
a moment” (Mikkonen 55), panels are percept-affects, blocs of sensation, a formlessness given
form (I shall return to this later).
This does not mean the static comics image is incomplete, as though a moving stream
were its teleological end. It means instead that the comics image, through its ostensibly static and
caricatured nature offers something altogether different from the mechanized gaze of a film
camera. The comics image is not the mere representation of instant in space-time, but the
bringing together of perception and affection into a self-existent percept-affect, a compound of
sensations. Both of these aspects are inherent to the comics image, indeed they constitute its very
nature. Thus Chute, and Spiegelman with her, is right to see a connection between memory and
the comics image, only the similarity goes further than they suggest. Both are percept-affects,
“partial” instants—at least so we think when compared to our immediate experience—composed
of sensations.

24

Like memory, time in the comics sequence is not chronological and causal. There can be
no linearity, no chronology, no causality between percept-affects. Nor can there be any causal
link between images—one panel does not cause another panel, nor do its contents cause the
contents of any other panel. If the gutter exists as the relation of difference between images, it
divides those images, figuring the independent existence between each bloc of sensations. But
the gutter as difference is still a difference that connects. The gutter as a relation of difference
connects the two panels, not in a relation of causality, but through one of affective meaning.
McCloud’s sixth transition type, the non-sequitur, once considered the least prevalent of
transitions, turns out to be the only transition. The gutter connects panels via an acausal principle
of synchronicity.
To explore this idea, let us take up a sequence from Maus seemingly connected by
causality. In the given image (Fig. 3), Vladek relates to Art his experience of being questioned
by Nazi soldiers while carrying a bag of sugar. At first reading, one thinks the panels are linked
via causality—the soldiers’ question causes Vladek’s response. Of course, this is true if one
enforces a largely representational philosophy onto the image and an experiential flow of time
onto the sequence. But if each image exists as a bloc of sensations, a self-existing percept-affect,
they cannot have a causal connection—an affect does not cause another affect, nor does a percept
produce another percept. Instead the images themselves become linked by the affective meaning
produced through their difference. From this meaning-out-of-sensations, the reader imposes
narrative, a causal and linear experience. It has been said that humans create meaning from
experience. Comics reverse this mantra by invoking a meaning from juxtaposed blocs of
sensation from which the reader then creates a narrative. Only the sensations exist in the comics
image itself; the narrative is the imposition of a narrating mind.
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Fig. 3 illustrates this further. As mentioned, the images themselves possess no causal
connection. Only once Vladek’s narration has been imposed over the sequence do they become
connected through a sense of causality, that this event causes the next. It is important to note that
I am not speaking here of sequence itself, as in one panel followed by the next and then the next.
But rather, one panel, i.e. event, as causing another. The narrator creates this perception by
stringing panels together in the narrative flow of a textual story. This imprinting of narrative
logic onto the panels helps explain the widespread acceptance of the sequence as a type of
storyboard illustrating stages in a flow of action. The flow of action results from Vladek’s
narration; it does not exist in the images themselves.
At first glance, Groensteen’s concept of monstration contradicts what I have just argued.
Although Groensteen admits comics images possess no intrinsic narrativity, he seems to belie
this claim later via his concept of monstration—comics images, being necessarily drawings,
function as apt examples that “what is seen is the result of what is shown, and therefore of a
decision at the level of enunciation” (Narration 86, emphasis in original). For Groensteen, this
means isolating “what pertains specifically to the drawing inasmuch as it is driven by a narrative
intention and imbued with subjectivity” (86). I should clarify that, here, Groensteen understands
the comics image as but the creation of an artist, not an independent entity. Granting him this
premise, all art does require the artist to select what (s)he will depict. Yet this decision, rather
than being based on narrative intentions, is determined by the artist’s perceptions and affections.
The artist does not convey a story in the image, but a mood, an experience, sensations. Nonnarrative, i.e. abstract, comics illustrate this reality of (sequential) images—the images
themselves rely less on narrative than on perceptions and affections. Groensteen’s monstration
compares showing a story to telling a story as an act of enunciation. But one does not show a
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story; all stories are told. The narrative is in the imprint of a narrative mind onto the graphic
sequence. The images exist as blocs of sensations, i.e. percepts and affects, not as narrative units.
It is the same with memory. One remembers a sound, a touch, an image, and the whole narrative
sequence comes to the rememberer’s mind, but (s)he does not remember the sequence, only the
perceptions and affections of that sequence. The groom does not remember the first time he
danced with his wife. He remembers the lights, the catch of his breath, her eyes and smile, the
heat, a desire for permanence—yet he never remembers the whole dance in sequence. We
remember in blocs of sensations, not in movement. We organize these blocs via a narrative
imposition, but the narrative does not exist even in the sequence of sensations itself. The
narrative is only a way to categorize, to arrange, the sensations.
Does this mean the sequence, being an arrangement of comics images, blocs of
sensations, is by nature narrative? Not at all. A narrative requires an arrangement, but an
arrangement does not equate a narrative. This is one of the truths revealed by abstract comics.
The images in these non-narrative comics are arranged into sequences, although not necessarily
narrative sequences. Given they are sequences, they are still arranged by some sort of meaning,
but I suggest that meaning is an affective meaning. Faced with these myriad blocs of sensations
juxtaposed alongside one another, a new sensation arises, for the multitude of images become
one image, a percept-affect comprised of percept-affects. This does not mean a new object comes
into being, a more complex image composed of smaller, simpler images. It rather means that the
interaction of sensations in the comics images produces new sensations. Through their relations
of difference, the comics images produce new images, but not more complex images.
Returning to Groensteen, his five principles of narrative drawings—anthropocentrism,
synecdochic simplification, typification, expressivity, rhetorical convergence—are not unique to
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comics, nor need they apply to all drawings employed towards relating a narrative (System 1612). For instance, Christophe Chabouté’s The Park Bench and Richard McGuire’s Here are not
anthropocentric. Many (auto)biographical comics, e.g. Joe Sacco’s oeuvre, do not rely on
simplification or typification. These are, in fact, not characteristics of narrative drawings as a
whole, but one certain style of drawing. It is not true of the comics image itself, but of a specific
style and form of the comics image.
In most, if not every, analysis of Maus, and even comics at large, critics approach the text
and image as one, understanding each part as providing different, albeit compatible, information
towards advancing the narrative. Such readings emphasize the information value of the panel and
narrative progression overall. Story is everything here. By contrast, in a discussion of the graphic
adaptation of City of Glass, Hannah Miodrag remarks:
The pictures contribute much more than a tautological illustration: picture and
text are drawn into a rhetorical transaction, gaining an aesthetic impact rather than
hard content. The artistic value of this segment and its combined elements is
rather depleted if couched only in terms of information value…[which]
mistakenly sets the functional dispensing of information above aesthetic impact.
The atmospheric contribution these pictures make is not negligible because they
contribute little additional narrative information: they are metaphorical, engaging,
and imaginatively arousing (92).
In stressing the panel’s existence as a bloc of sensations rather than a block of space-time, I aim
to emphasize the panel’s aesthetic impact mentioned by Miodrag over its informational quality.
This is what I meant when I referred to the image as not primarily or merely representational.
This is not to say that images, and specifically the panel, cannot convey information, but rather
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that their primary power as drawings lies in their aesthetic force, their status as compounds of
sensations. This is a theoretical shift from understanding the image as in service to a higher
narrative towards the image as an object itself.
Words do not possess this same force. Words can evoke sensations in us through the
meaning we associate with them. A text-only narrative of Vladek’s Shoah experience may
conjure sensations of sadness, pity, horror, rage, etc. in the reader through the social and personal
meanings the reader attaches to each words. To put it another way, language does not harbor
these sensations, nor does it represent these sensations, but it is the meaning we attach to words
that evokes sensations. Pictures work differently however. Leonardo da Vinci writes,
Painting represents its essence to you in one moment though the faculty of vision
by the same means as the imprensiva receives the objects in nature, and thus it
simultaneously conveys the proportional harmony of which the parts of the whole
are composed, and delights the senses. Poetry presents the same thing but by a
less noble means than by the eye, conveying it more confusedly to the imprensiva
and describing the configurations of the particular objects more slowly than is
accomplished by the eye (23).2
Painting here may refer just as well to drawings or images for da Vinci’s overall thesis concerns
the difference between image and language. Poetry (read: language) for da Vinci inhibits the
reader’s reception of other objects. Its confused conveyance of meaning results from the arbitrary
and durational nature inherent to language. By contrast, painting (read: images) presents objects
to the viewing all at once without delay. Da Vinci here refers to the sensational force of images

2

The word imprensiva for da Vinci refers to the mental faculty that apprehends the visual.
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that language lacks. This sensational force is immediate, non-durational, and so remains
unaffected by language’s prerequisite linear temporality.
The images primarily sensational force can even find some support from recent studies in
the field of cognitive science. Although Neil Cohn may perhaps be the most well-known
individual to have carried out studies of comics in the field of cognitive science, his work largely
concerns image comprehension and how readers understand narratives through the images.
Others have meanwhile conducted extensive research on the different ways people process and
understand pictures and words. Many such studies produce results that suggest images produce a
greater emotional response in the brain than do words (Kennedy et al.; Kensinger and Schacter).
A recent exception to this conclusion is the 2013 study by Schlochtermeier et al., which
concluded no significant emotional response difference between simple sentences, complex
sentences, and simple pictures. It is worth noting, however, that “complex pictures” produced
greater emotional response than all three of these other categories, suggesting that complex
images, e.g. detailed drawings, carry greater emotional force than words (Schlochtermeier et al.
9). This study in particular carries implications regarding Groensteen’s five principles of
narrative drawing, as one key feature of his these principles is pictorial simplicity. This study
may then lend support to Groensteen’s linguistic-semiotic interpretation of comics, in
suggesting, although not proving, a similar affective response to simplified images—what
qualifies as an simple image remains a significant question.
My overall purpose in this digression, however, is to point out the possible, although not
inconclusive, support for this thesis in the field of cognitive science. The primarily sensational
nature of the image can find support in not only aesthetics, but also contemporary science.
Perhaps people react more strongly to (“complex”) images because images, even what
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Groensteen calls “narrative drawings,” are primarily sensational objects. Their power does not lie
in the information they impart but in the sensations they embody and produce in the viewer.
As Miodrag emphasizes, by speaking of comics or the comics panel as a language, critics
overlook the comics image’s aesthetic impact. But the visual element of comics is a separate
entity from the text and so deserves to be addressed on its own terms (Miodrag 98-9). Miodrag
interprets the theorization of comics as language to be a “perceptible defensiveness that has
bequeathed to comics studies a critical framework constructed in order to promote the visual to
the (perceived) higher status of language” (171). The irony of this central framework lies in the
fact that, for those such as Leonardo da Vinci, the image stands higher than the word due to its
nigh-direct access to the imprensiva. Images, including the comics panel, create meaning in ways
obviously different than words. This difference is obvious in its experiential quality, though not
always so in its theoretical enunciation. This is what the semiotic comics critics, or even Neil
Cohn in his conception of visual language, miss when trying to interpret the comics image to fit a
linguistic model. Even if language and images can be theoretically equalized, a difference
remains in how people experience/perceive them—a difference which cannot always be put into
words. Whether one consents to da Vinci’s idea of the imprensiva makes little difference in
regards to his much larger thesis: that images possess an immediate sensational force distinct
from language.
This sensational force is necessary to the nature of the comics panel, supporting my thesis
of the image’s existence as a bloc of sensations. It is not solely representational. Johanna
Drucker’s description of Chris Ware’s oeuvre equally applies to all comic art: “Ware fills his
graphics with representational content. They speak (if the use of a linguistic metaphor may be
excused here in the service of an often mute graphic sensibility) of and as the world they show.
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In a very real, literal sense, they (the graphics) are the world, they do not just represent it” (45).
Most comic readings, e.g. Hillary Chute’s of Maus, approach comics images as attempts towards
representing the world humans experience. But this is a realist interpretation of the image. It
understands the world humans experience as the base reality from and to which all art moves.
But the comics image, indeed all images, do not merely represent the world of human
experience; they are their own world. Taking Spiegelman’s Maus as an example: the images that
comprise Maus do not represent Vladek’s Shoah experience, but are the percept-affects of a
Shoah experience.
Thus, the famous image from Maus II of Spiegelman at his drawing desk atop a mound
of dead mouse bodies, i.e. Holocaust victims, actually demonstrates Spiegelman’s
misunderstanding of the precise nature of the comics image. Spiegelman’s troubles here partly
result from the ethical quandary of whether he is right to profit from his father’s (and other
Holocaust victims’) suffering. Throughout both volumes, he evidences a related worry over
accurately depicting Vladek’s time in Auschwitz. Such representational fears, however, miss a, if
not the, primary aesthetic force of the comics image. The nature of the comics image as perceptaffect means it is not foremost a representational entity, but an affective one. Being a compound
of sensations, it does not aim to represent the world, but to create a world. Any sort of
representational nature inherent to the comics image only serves this end, the creation of the
panel as a compound of sensations.
This aesthetic shift from representational to sensational is important for the space-equalstime thesis of comics studies, for the nature of comics images as representations undergirds the
thesis. Critics interpret panels as spatializing time across the page because panels are blocks of
space-time, contained representations of specific moments. This does not capture the comics
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panel’s entire nature however. The
panel is neither foremost nor ultimately
a representational entity, but a perceptaffect, a compound of sensations, a
world in itself. Its representational
status only serves this end. Of course, if
the comics panel is a compound of
sensations, it does not map linear time
across the page as theorists suggest; it
maps percepts and affects. The comics
image is not essentially a narrative
sequence, but an affective sequence.
This is important for the way
comics are understood. Hillary Chute
Fig. 4 Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale I: My
Father Bleeds History, Pantheon, 1986, p. 103

writes, “With its febrile, nontransparent
lines and its hand-drawn juxtaposed

boxes that enclose, underline, and present a succession of moments, almost as in a series of
windows, comics offers images replete with their own sense of turning toward the outside”
(Disaster 179). The idea of comics panels as a “succession of moments” reflects a limited view
of the comics image I have been discussing. In an earlier essay, Chute writes of one image from
Maus (Fig. 4), “here Spiegelman obsessively layers several temporalities in one tiny frame,
understood by the conventions of the comics medium to represent one moment in time”
(“Shadow” 208). But this panel is not one moment in time. What it instead figures via these five
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unrelated drawings is, quite literally, a compound of sensations, affectations involved with
various perceptions from Art’s memory or imagination. In fact, Spiegelman’s four-page comicwithin-a-comic demonstrates this via its heavy stylization. The style does not recreate the world,
but embodies Art’s sensations tied to these moments. These are not blocks of space-time, but
blocs of sensations. Spiegelman here does not render a subjective representation of the world, but
a becoming-with the world. It is Art’s becoming-prisoner, a becoming-matricide. The panels lift
Art’s subjective perceptions to percepts existing apart from him and humanity. The succession of
moments is, in fact, a succession of sensations.
Replacing the phrase “a succession of moments” with “a succession of sensations” may
seem irrelevant—the overall point remains that boxes possess a succession of images separated
by the gutter, or so one may argue. But this concept of the gutter as a divider, an entity enacting
separation, is precisely what has been argued against. When blocs of sensations are juxtaposed,
pure difference comes into being. This difference neither precedes nor results from juxtaposition
but exists at once with it. Rather than being that which divides, the relation of difference
between panels is that which connects—panels as blocs of sensation are connected via an acausal
relation of difference. Chute’s claim that the comics image turns toward the outside, as if moving
into the McCloudian gutter as signifying absence, cannot be compatible with the gutter as a
relation of difference. The gutter is neither a space, idea, nor entity into which one can move, but
a term to signify the connective difference between panels.
But how precisely can this difference connect? Groensteen and Mikkonen propose that
repetition, e.g. that of a main character, or text connects panels together in the face of their selfenclosed nature. Perhaps, however, repetition does not establish conjunctional meaning but
rather does the panel itself, that is, the structure, the panel with its incumbent idea of the frame.
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“Art begins not with flesh but with the house,” writes Deleuze, and he goes on to explain art’s
contingence upon the frame (“Percept” 186). This frame, more largely structure, allows
connection between panels. It encloses, literally or figuratively, compounds of sensations,
structuring their infinite disorder with lines and colors—the panel enforces Apollonian structure
upon Dionysian sensations. The page layout or graphic sequence refers to the arrangement of
panels, the structuring of structures one might say, and it is this structure that infers an acausal
relation between each panel, a relation of difference, which connects each panel to all the others.
Echoing Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, one may say it is the panels’ Apollonian
individuation via arrangement or structure that connects them together in relations of difference.
This structuralization produces connection and thereby meaning, both of which are nonnarrative. As I have suggested above in re Maus, Groensteen’s idea of the text-as-connector is
actually the text as imposition of narrative. The text merely establishes narrative continuity
between panels, a continuity which the repetition of a character supports but does not establish
alone.
Of course, to claim the text enforces a narrative onto the images that is never inherently
there reeks of a separatist vision—the text and image are separate entities that together comprise
the comic object. Many comics theorists rely on this exact logic—the comics medium results
from an integration of word and image, two traditionally different mediums existing as a
collaborative whole. But although most comics theorists purport this sentiment, most approach
the comics medium primarily through a linguistic-narrative lens. In other words, as Hannah
Miodrag discusses near the end of her book Comics and Language, the comics image has
generally taken a back seat to the comics text and story arc. This is particularly evident in
criticism of Maus. Studies by individuals such as Erin McGlothlin, Ana Merino, and Mireille
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Ribière emphasize the literary/narrative qualities of Maus over its pictorial and aesthetic impact.
Miodrag suggests this arises from a critical tendency to glorify the comics medium and a lowlevel paranoia against separating the linguistic and pictorial aspects of comics lest the medium by
seen as nothing save a Frankensteinian art form (Miodrag 197-8).
It is this very separation between word and image, however, that aids towards exposing
the problem in understanding the nature of comics as a “diagrammatic form: its fundamental
narrative movement is to diagram time as space on the page” (Chute, Disaster 183). As Hannah
Miodrag and Neil Cohn have argued, the conception of time as space on the page refers to
narrative time (Miodrag 118). But as I have suggested, the narrative is largely a textual
imposition upon the panels as sensations. Narrative time, thus, refers to textual time, as the
images in themselves lack a linear narrative, i.e. causal, temporality (what temporality they do
possess I will address later). A text possesses a separate temporal flow to that of the image.
This likewise reflects the nature of the image’s meaning production. Without any text, the
image bears an affective resonance, but no strictly informational meaning. Remove the text from
a sequence in Maus and the image can be interpreted in a thousand ways, each meaning lending
an alternative nuance to the image’s sensational force, but still the image—its style, color,
shading, and other pictorial elements—retains its aesthetic and sensational impact. Remove the
image from the text however, and the text retains all the information it ever had. The comics
image does not operate primarily on a narrative or informational level, but as an aesthetic entity,
a compound of sensations.
This should help expose the logical lapse in characterizing comics by their supposed
spatialization of time. One could easily make the same claim of novels, the difference being that
one uses words only while the other uses words and images. As a reader moves across and down
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the page of a novel, (s)he moves in narrative time, exactly as comics theorists suggest readers do
in comics. The difference between these two mediums remains in that novels spatialize time with
words while comics do so with images. But as I have suggested, the causal temporality of which
theorists speak is a mere imposition of the text onto the image. Thus, both novels and comics
may spatialize time, but both do so in the same fashion, via words across the page.

Fig. 5 Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale II: And Here My Troubles Began,
Pantheon, 1991, p. 68
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In this way, even though Art creates a comic from his father’s story, the story must be
initially narrated through words. A narrative must be imposed from the linguistic mind. At one
point in Maus’ second volume, Art superimposes a timeline over the comics panel (Fig. 5). Like
most timelines, this one is composed primarily of words—there are not images, merely words
arranged across a straight line (though, of course, one may contend this is itself an image). The
superimposition of this diagram of words over the comics panel visualizes the imposition of
narrative by language onto the comics panels. The time line arranges events into a linear and
causal sequence, much as Vladek’s narration does to the images.
This relates to the nature of memory. In a critical analysis of Maus, Joshua Brown writes,
“Vladek’s account is not a chronicle of undefiled fact but a construction process, that
remembering is a construction of the past” (95). Brown here suggests that remembering involves
creating past instants in one’s mind and then sorting and arranging those past events into a linear
sequence. In this way, the rememberer constructs the past. But this is how the narrative mind
makes use of memory, not necessarily how one remembers. When one remembers, one does not
remember sequences or even stories. Memories are perceptions and affections; they are the
details of an instant, but never the instant in its entirety, and the details are melded with feeling.
Upon remembering these blocs of sensations, the narrative mind organizes them into a linear
sequence and constructs a narrative. But this ordering does not constitute an act of remembering.
It is only how the narrative and linguistic mind makes sense of the disparate and discontinuous
nature of memory as a compound of sensations.
If a narrative temporality only appears due to the imposition of a narrating mind on blocs
of sensations, whether comics panels or memories, do these sensations lack temporality
altogether? To answer yes is to assume time must be causal, linear, continuous—in short,
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narrative time. This is not the only temporal form however. The comics panels, and memory, do
not exist outside of time but in another mode of time, a non-narrative temporality, an acausal
synchronicity. In this temporal mode, instants are not connected via causality, but meaning—an
affective meaning rather than an informational or narrative one. Thus the disparate images can be
viewed as one collective image, oft referred to as the sequence or page. This acausal
synchronicity allows for the images to be a Jungian unus mundus of sensation.
The comics object visualizes this time in its fragmentary structure. The time of memory
and comics is not the continuous flow of cinema or human experience but a fragmentary time. In
its co-present and fragmentary nature, this time is non-linear and acausal. Resonant with the
philosophy of eternalism, all instants are present at once, scattered across space-time. They are
strung together by non-localisable connections so that no instant affects another without being
affected in turn, although this in no way makes these instants contingent upon each other.
Neither does this time consist of potentially objective representations. The comics panel, much
like memory, exists as a bloc of sensations, the concoction of perception and affection raised to
the level of percept and affect—a subjectivity made self-existent. While it refers back to an
actual moment, it does not represent that moment but manifests the artist’s perception and
affection connected to that moment.
When Hillary Chute speaks of the Maus page shown in Fig. 5, suggesting that “The
diagram represents a disagreement; the son is ‘imposing order’ while the survivor caught up in
his testimony resists that historiographic impulse,” she strikes at the two different temporalities I
have discussed (“Shadow” 210). She interprets Art and Vladek’s roles in Maus as those of
archiver and witness, respectively. While Vladek recounts his experience of Auschwitz without
any necessary linearity, and so causality, Art seeks to arrange the memories into a coherent

39

narrative. In this way, he seeks to impart causality onto Vladek’s memories, which in their
originary form are a collection of independent compounds of sensations. They exist in an
acausal, synchronous temporality.
Of course, Art chooses to present his narrative of Vladek’s memories as a comic, the very
art form I have been comparing to memory in how its visual portion, i.e. panels, bears no
inherent linear and causal flow being but synchronous compounds of sensations. The narrative
arises from the imposition of the text. Alone, the images evoke sensations, for they exist as such,
but do not necessarily evoke a story. The story appears with the imposition of the logos. Each
comics panel is an independent and self-existing bloc of sensations. When situated on the page
among other panels, each panel acts upon the others through relations of difference. In this way,
the panels create their own meaning, albeit a non-verbal meaning, a sensational meaning not
expressed in words. Abstract comics reveal this as part of the comics panel’s nature. It likewise
exists in narrative comics, though covered up by the abundance of linguistic signs.
To prevent misunderstanding, I should clarify that the point of all this is not that comics
panels cannot create a narrative, only that narrative is not the most fundamental connection
between panels. This is what is at stake in the gutter-as-signifying-absence thesis and in speaking
of comics as language, or even employing a visual language. The gutter is but the acausal
relation of difference between panels, not a space in which the reader’s imagination completes
the narrative flow. It is only a relation, and not a causal one at that; it is a relation of affective
meaning between blocs of percept-affects, compounds of sensations. The comics image’s
primary force lies in its aesthetic and affective impact, an aspect of the image all too often
ignored by critics in favor of narrative and linguistic qualities. Echoing Leonardo da Vinci, the
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image is not the same as language, and thereby can neither be dealt with the same nor forced into
a linguistic-semiotic theoretical frame.
Neil Cohn writes, “The study of sequential image comprehension becomes less about
analysing what is ‘out there’ in the sequence or our conscious experience of it, but more what is
inside our own minds” (“Limits” 144). Though I disagree with Cohn that this analysis concerns
conceptual information, he and I remain in agreement on the need for attention to what happens
within the reader. Our difference lies in Cohn’s focus on the reader’s cognition, his/her
processing of informational meaning, while my own theory emphasizes what is felt, the
sensations and aesthetic-affective impact of the image.
The Text-Image Relation
This is important for how comics are often understood as a hybrid medium. Many critics
consider the image and text as working together to produce meaning and narrative in comics,
although critics differ on which plays a larger role. Still there remains a critical consensus
concerning the duality of meaning-production in comics via both text and image. But in the
schema I have suggested, the role of both text and image in this hybrid medium changes. The
text becomes that which confers a specified informational and narrative meaning onto the text
while the image exists apart as an aesthetic and affective entity. The text signifies
informational/narrative meaning while the image embodies sensations. One is informational and
narrative while the other is primarily aesthetic. The text-image hybridism can therefore be
understood as an informational-aesthetic hybrid, the bridging of language and pre-linguistic
sensation.
Comics theorists generally consider the word balloon as part of the comics image
(Postema 82). Although they consider comics a hybrid medium of text and image, the word
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balloon itself is thought to exist as part of the image. There is indeed a visual rationale here, as
the word balloon typically does not extend beyond the boundaries of the panel frame and the
speech balloon is itself a drawing, an image of sorts, which may prompt critics to speak of it as
an image-sign signifying speech, thought, or the like.
Hannah Miodrag counters this idea when she writes, “Speech balloons are part of comics’
non-pictorial visual content, supporting apparatus… whose form-specific shorthand proves
conducive to critical attempts to argue the medium is a language” (180). While conceding that
the speech balloon may function as sign or signifier, she argues comics symbols, e.g. the word
balloon, relies more heavily on contextualization for meaning-production than do words.
Additionally, she remarks, “There is no imperative to use comics’ conventionalized signifying
practices” (183). This can seen in comics such as Calvin and Hobbes, wherein Watterson often
does away with the speech balloon altogether, inclining instead to simply write dialogue over or
beside the character (Fig. 6).

Fig. 6 Bill Watterson, The Complete Calvin and Hobbes, Book One, Andrews McMeel
Publishing, 2005, p. 257
Despite the contrarian nature of Miodrag’s overall critical analysis, of which the world
balloon argument is but a sample, she still concedes to the widespread semiotic approach for
interpreting comics images. This rises to the fore in her reading of David Mazzucchelli’s
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Asterios Polyp. She writes of the various drawing styles and colors Mazzucchelli employs
throughout: “We come to recognize the meaning suggested by the fracturing into personalized
styles based on our growing knowledge of what it implies: the device develops into a kind of
‘langue of the text’” (175-6, emphasis in original). For her, the images, and the colors and styles
that compose them, operate as signifiers and producers of meaning. Though adamant on the
differences between how words and images produce meaning, both retain the same basic
function for Miodrag as signifiers, though she argues that whatever images signify relies more
heavily on contextualization than do words.

CDVI't yo", eve,
[oV\ve(satioV1

h"",e. "

tv-"t

;sV\'t

obo",t

WHAT'S THAT
SUPPOSED

TO

MEAN?

Lfou~

Sudde.V\\~ you're.

<WI

e."pen-

0'1

V\'\lAsic.~ CouldVl't it be. poss',bletv,a t VIM '-\ be. - 1>\ a '1be. - Va Iv 'iVI

kvlOWS more.. Clbol.d- it t\!\alO you?

Fig. 7 David Mazzucchelli, Asterios Polyp, Pantheon, 2006, n.p.

IS IT O'(..AY II' I
ANSWE:R
ON!..Y oNE

QUESTION AT A 11ME?

43

But this still approaches the comics image through a linguistic model, which Miodrag
professes to oppose, and so fails to capture the total nature of the image as an image. The
different drawing styles and coloring deployed throughout Asterios Polyp also produce emotion
and sensation in the viewer. The stiff, blue lines forming the eponymous main character do not
only signify coldness and rationality, but further conjure such sensations in the viewer. To speak
of the image as only representative, as a sort of signifier, fails to exhaust its imagistic nature. As
I have argued previously, it is a bloc of sensations, the manifestation of affects. Miodrag explains
of one sequence in Asterios Polyp (Fig. 7):
These drawing styles are motivated. The blunt, arrogant, coldly logical
architecture professor is constructed of geometric shapes rendered in clean, blue
outlines, his mathematical planes and angles unsoftened by any subtleties of
shading. Hana, meanwhile, a meek and self-conscious artist, is presented in
warmly pink, dense, and scratchy cross-hatching, with deepening patches of color
filling in roundness and organic detail, where Asterios is clinical and mechanical
(175).
The repeated use of such stylizations constitutes what Miodrag above refers to as the “langue of
the text.” But that is to interpret these stylizations as signifiers through a semiotic lens. The
distinct stylizations of both Asterios and Hana, however, do not merely signify coldness or
warmth, respectively, but embody the related affects while conjuring the corresponding
sensations in the viewer. In other words, Asterios’ polished, blue, mechanical outline does not
only signify frigid logicality and arrogance, but produces sensations of robotic coldness in the
viewer. The image does not merely represent, but is a self-existing bloc of sensations. It is an
affective object, not merely a signifying one.
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Barbara Postema writes, “The gap at work at this level [between text and image] is the
gap between the verbal and the visual as signifying systems” (82). What I have suggested in the
image-as-affective thesis, however, is that the text-image gap is not one between two signifying
systems, but a much wider gap between a signifying system and an affective system. The image
as affective exists on a pre-linguistic plane, the plane of sensation. What Miodrag refers to as the
malleability of meaning in the image (183-6) is actually the non-linguistic and affective impact
of the image. Being sensational, this impact of meaning only at first appears more malleable
because it cannot be put into words. It is fluid and formless, existing on the pre-linguistic plane.
The comics image does not produce meaning as dialogue or narration may, but bears an aesthetic
and affective force that language lacks.
My purpose in emphasizing the aesthetic-affective nature of the comics image is not to
deploy formalist art criticism towards analyzing “the aesthetic style of [comics] artwork” as
Hannah Miodrag attempts (197). Rather as I have sought to clarify in this essay’s introduction, I
aim to emphasize the chimeric duality of the comics medium, the nature of both the comics
image and text and, eventually, what sort of ontological vision their polymerization offers. Too
often, critics approach the image as a linguistic sign, as though it were little different than the
linguistic signs that make up words. Although approaches vary, such as Cohn’s visual language
thesis or the comics-as-language thesis voiced by many cartoon-theorists, this core imposition of
a linguistic model onto the image remains. This ignored the fundamental, affective nature of the
image—a nature not shared with the text.
Many critical analyses of comics, as mentioned in the previous section on Maus, tend to
emphasize comics’ literary and narrative qualities. Given that many of these critics are formally
trained in literary studies, perhaps this is only natural—their literary background heavily informs
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their work. Although an oversimplification to claim that all comics critics operate from a literary
framework, it seems clear that a large and significant portion of scholarship does. This has a
philosophical implication, best summarized (though unintentionally) by Robert Harvey:
Although the comics are fundamentally a graphic medium, it was the
incorporation of words within the pictures that gave the medium its peculiar life
and vitality. Outside the comics (albeit still within the graphic arts), people are
drawn in speechless pantomime, condemned to relatively lifeless posturing and
posing (“Aesthetics” 641-2).
So Harvey suggests the image alone is a lifeless entity, the text being the breath of God breathed
by the cartoonist into a static image. But the text only imparts narrative and information. The
image itself lives apart as an aesthetic-affective entity, a bloc of sensations; it possesses a
sensational life the text lacks. It is only that what Harvey considers life is the linguistic, the
specified meaning the text pinpoints onto the image from outside. The image(s) can live
perfectly well on its own—Peter Kuper’s The System and Christophe Chabouté’s Park Bench,
even a handful of Watterson’s Calvin and Hobbes Sunday strips, are testimonies to that. They
alone can confer meaning, though their meaning is not the causal, narrative, and informational
kind Harvey and many other critics seem to esteem so highly. The image bears a sensational
meaning, one that exists prior to the text and can transcend language. It is the pre- and suprarational, the non-linguistic, an aesthetic force the reader perceives in an instant, for it conjures a
sensational response, and sensations requires no duration, save only the duration of time it takes
to be put into words.
As I have digressed at length in the previous chapter, the text is but meaning-specific
material imposed over the image. Peer Meter and Barbara Yelin’s Gift illustrates this well.
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Throughout the first few pages, indeed through the whole book, word balloons frequently
transcend panel borders (Fig. 8). Although not unique to Gift, this technique is not altogether
common in comics, yet it visually manifests the theoretical imposition of text over image in the
comics medium that I have suggested. One could easily move each bit of dialogue from its word

Fig. 8 Peter Meer and Barbara Yelin, Gift, Reprodukt, 2010, p. 10
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balloon into a corresponding space beneath the respective image and the image would not be
altered much, if at all. The word balloon is but a means for attempting to insert the text into the
image. Yet the balloon’s vacuous white space interrupts the image. In comics with a minimum of
detail, and therefore plenty of white space, e.g. Peanuts or Calvin and Hobbes, the word balloon
seems to meld into the image. Its white space blends with the surrounding area. But in more
detailed comics like Gift, and especially colored comics, the word balloon’s white form breaks
up—dare I say disrupts?—the image, and thereby reveals its status as an imposition upon the
comics image.
David Carrier recognizes the word balloon as “a method of representing thoughts and
words” (4), although this statement is truer in spirit than literality. The word balloon, so often
considered a signifier of speech or thought in comics criticism, functions as the entity by which
text intrudes onto the image. The pseudo-imagistic nature of the word balloon allows text to
impose itself onto the comics image without overtly seeming to do so by creating what appears
to be another imagistic component of the panel overall. That critics have long considered the
balloon a part of the image evidences the success of its Trojan-Horse enterprise. It does not add
to the meaning of the image, but brings an altogether novel meaning.
But a question arises concerning the nature of the word balloon. May we consider it a
third object of the comics medium alongside the image and text? The word balloon may indeed
signify speech, thought, or narration for the reader, and its signification is based largely on
context. If it is the entity by which the text overlays the image, one may be tempted to recognizes
it as a third fundamental object of comics. Simplified, the text, image, and word balloon would
then be linguistic, affective, and semiotic objects respectively. I disagree with this however,
suggesting that the word balloon is but a pictorial device by which the text imposes upon the

48

image. In this sense, the word balloon is contingent upon the text and may be understood as an
extension of it. It is much like the panel frame, which is not an object in itself but an (optional)
extension of the comics image. If anything, though, the word balloon does highlight the
difficulty for critics to recognize what is and is not part of the image.
Any reader may well recognize in this image-text juxtaposition the echoes of a traditional
binary between emotion and logic, and (s)he is right to do so. The comics image conveys
precisely that, the coming together of the linguistic and the aesthetic, that formed by the mind
and that which eludes form. Thus we find resonance with Tristan Garcia’s reading of Marvel’s
Doctor Strange comics. “Doctor Strange articulates the struggle between the two drives that
inhabit every draftsman: to cut up piece by piece, so as to give form to things; and to let flows,
variations, and the intensities of colors and forms proliferate, all the way to the limit of the
indistinct” (n.p.). One may initially suspect this tension between form and the formless inherent
to comics arises in the opposition between the panel and the gutter, finding its visual parallel in
the tension between that which is seen and unseen. Although Garcia hints at such, he does not
limit the formless to the blank space between panels. He writes further of Doctor Strange, “We
might say that [Steve] Ditko and [Stan] Lee sought to catalogue all possible modes of appearance
of the formless, the malleable, the vague, the almost, precisely so as to feel out the very solidity
of the comic’s system of outlining and cutting-out, and the reason that lies behind them” (n.p.). It
is in the panels of Doctor Strange, then, that the reader witnesses the formless; through the
Doctor’s adventures across physics-defying hallucinogenic dreamscapes, Ditko visualizes the
constant struggle between linguistic form and sensational formlessness in comics.
The graphic novel Doctor Strange: Into Shamballa has gone largely unnoticed in
academic criticism, although both Hugo and Frey have discussed the Marvel graphic novel series
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Fig. 9 J.M. DeMatteis and Dan Green, Doctor Strange: Into Shamballa, The Marvel Comics
Group, 1986, n.p.
of which it was a part (79-80). It was published in 1986, the same year volume one of Maus was
published and Frank Miller’s The Dark Knight Returns was serialized, a year that popular media
has previously signified as comics’ coming of age. This Doctor Strange comic proclaims in
white text across its front cover “A Marvel Graphic Novel.” Maus, The Dark Knight Returns,
and Watchmen, all published in or around 1986, are referred to as the Big Three in popular media
that truly began the adult graphic novel movement, revolutionizing comics in demonstrating how
comics can be for grown-ups (Hugo and Frey 80-1). Doctor Strange: Into Shamballa and the
other Marvel graphic novels of its series, however, despite their clearly mature content and selfdesignation as graphic novels, have received no such popular recognition, although as
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mentioned, disparate critics like Jan Baetans and Hugo Frey have remarked on them. There are
perhaps many reasons for this, but in light of Garcia’s comments on the nature of Doctor
Strange, I wish to turn to this largely unnoticed graphic novel.
In Into Shamballa, Doctor Strange finds himself pulled into a universe of illusion and
formlessness, the realm of Shamballa, where he encounters Maya, the Queen of Illusion. For
those unfamiliar, Shamballa is taken from Hindu-Buddhist tradition, the birthplace of Vishnu’s
final incarnation from whence the Golden Age shall come; it is said to be a land whose reality is
spiritual as much as geographic. This Doctor Strange graphic novel appropriately depicts
Shamballa as a realm of harmonized chaos (Fig. 9). When Strange first enters this Dionysian
realm, the Lords of Shamballa speak to him “in words that are not words; in symbols and sounds,
scents and textures. Your mind grasps, but the words remain unintelligible” (DeMatteis and
Green n.p.). Is this not an apt description of the comics image? A word that is not a word.
Theorists have so long construed the comics image as a semiotic unit, the pictorial equivalent of
a textual utterance, because the comics sequence appears to harness the power of telling a story
without words. But as I have digressed, it is more than that. Miodrag is right to criticize much of
comics criticism for over-applying a linguistic model to the comics image. The nature of the
image as a bloc of sensations means it harnesses an aesthetic force foreign to the word. It can
narrate, but it does so by speaking in words that are not words; its language is that of pure
percept-affects. Its meaning, what information it imparts, cannot be grasped by the mind but is
rather felt, experienced, transcending the page and drawing the viewer into its shapes, colors,
lines, and tones—the manifestations of pure affect. In Fig. 9, then, Doctor Strange stands in for
the comics reader as he falls into a formless expanse among beings who are “more consciousness
than form.”
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Fig. 10 Art Spiegelman, Maus: A Survivor's Tale II: And Here My Troubles
Began, Pantheon, 1986, p. 116
As Garcia notes, “In Strange the very borders of things, within each image, are
continually on the point of giving way, even while they remain in place” (n.p.). And so it is in
Into Shamballa—the image threatens to bleed out despite the page’s grey border, for what stops
the washed colors from passing beyond? Their sensations pour out and through the viewer.
Critics are mistaken to describe the comics image as static; like Shamballa, it is a “constantlyshifting landscape,” the printed embodiment of formless percepts and affects. The comics panel
is not so much a picture in itself as it is a window into an alternative consciousness, an affective
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world independent of the reader and the creator. This is the importance of one sequence near the
end of Maus’ second volume (Fig. 10), in which several panels portray Vladek sitting on the
couch looking through a pile of photographs. Each of these enclosed panels do not portray one
instant of space-time, the text with its durational import only makes them each appear as such.
Rather each is a window onto Art and Vladek’s affective world. The breaking up of panels
manifests Vladek’s internal division wrought by the Shoah.
Rocco Versaci claims “the comic book aesthetic projects unreality” (1), but this is
mistaken. The stylized and caricatured quality of comic book art of which Versaci speaks does
not project an unreality, but rather a self-existent, affective reality. Thus Hillary Chute astutely
remarks, “Images deliver us something words do not, however uncomfortable; that is part of

Fig. 11 J.M. DeMatteis and Dan Green, Doctor Strange: Into Shamballa, The Marvel Comics
Group, 1986, n.p.
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their allure and danger” (Disaster 260). Their caricatured style delivers a qualitatively different
experience of reality than text or film—indeed it portrays a different reality, one existing on the
border between form and formlessness. Chute suggests, “There exists a tension between the
revelatory strength of the image that operates with evidentiary force, on the one hand, and its
potency to trigger an affective response, on the other” (255). But this tension actually turns out to
be two sides of the comics images, so in fact, no tension exists. The comics image’s evidentiary
force is the affective response it triggers in the viewer. As others have remarked, comics do not
portray events as they happened in actuality, but the event’s affective experience. Through its
embodiment of affects, the comic gives evidence to the affective experience of an event so that
its evidentiary force and affective response are one in the same.
Here we can turn to a later sequence from Into Shamballa. As Doctor Strange surrenders
to an unnamed and formless mystical force, he perceives the entire world and a seemingly nonsequitur sequence ensues (Fig. 11). The sequence aims to portray Strange’s realization of what
the narrator has earlier described: “It is called the ley system—a series of invisible grids that
crisscross the globe, connecting primal power spots; earthly centers of divine energy” (n.p.). This
turns out to be an apt summation for the architecture of comics. Critics universally emphasize the
narrative movement or sequencing of the comics panel. They discuss the linear progression
through the panels that exists at once with the panels’ simultaneous immediacy on the page as a
unit. The gutter as a signifier of absence divides these panels, creating a grid, at times more
pronounced than at others. But as I have suggested prior, the gutter may also be the relation of
difference that connects panels, and the panels become these “power spots,” blocs of pure
sensation straddling the border between form and formlessness, the embodiment of pure affect.
As the mystic Hamir later remarks of Strange’s experience in Shamballa, “Words alone cannot
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explain it” (n.p.). This equally applies to the comics image’s aesthetic and affective force—it is a
power unexpressed in words, a sensation that cannot be told or understood but only felt, as it is
experienced in colors, tones, and brushstrokes.
This “ley system” aptly describes the acausal synchronicity I discussed above regarding
the affective meaning of the comics images. The images impart a sensational force to the reader
as the text aims to arrange this series of sensations into a linear narrative, or in other words, to
give form to the formless. In this way, to speak of comics as a hybrid medium is to describe its
object existence at the liminal boundary between form and formlessness. It occupies a peculiar
position between the temporal modes of linear causality and acausal synchronicity.
Concluding Remarks and Further Research
Hitherto I have belabored on the image’s aesthetic-affective nature, how this
differentiates it from text and what it means for the relationship between text and image, and thus
for comics’ status as a hybrid medium overall. I have sought to cover what I considered the
major theoretical points in this argument, constructing my own theory through various
counterpoints contra major theoretical theses in comics studies nowadays. My own proposed
theoretical framework has thereby largely argued that 1) the gutter be understood, not as a space
of absence, but the relation of difference between images, and 2) the aesthetic-affective nature of
the comics image as opposed to the informational-narrative nature of the text.
As mentioned in the essay’s introduction, the expert may find certain theoretical figures
or works excluded. For instance, in my prior discussion of the gutter, I gave no mention of Julia
Round’s proposition of the gutter as a sort of unconsciousness of the surrounding comics panels
from her book Gothic in Comics and Graphic Novels: A Critical Approach. There are several
reasons for such exclusions. As digressed in my introduction, a project of this sort comes with
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certain unavoidable limitations, such as those of time and space. There is simply insufficient time
and space in the present project to discuss every extant theory of the gutter—Randy Duncan and
Matthew J. Smith’s idea of repetition and change operating in the gutter, Round unconsciousness
thesis, or Groensteen’s more recent proposal of the second panel as canceling the first. But
another reason for such exclusions is my attempted focus on those critical and theoretical texts
that have the most direct relevance to the topic at hand as well as the most foundational roles in
comics studies. The fact remains that Scott McCloud’s gutter theory is the most well known and
holds a pivotal position in comics studies. Furthermore, all of the above theories of the gutter
retain, on some level, a spatial conceptualization of the gutter—McCloud simply does so most
overtly. As such, because of the aforementioned limitations that come with this project, it
seemed best to give most attention to McCloud’s theory while paying reference to other works
and thinkers.
Of course, were the present project to expand, such thinkers and texts would need to be
addressed more fully. For example, Duncan and Smith’s proposition of repetition and change
operating within the gutter was never fully addressed during the length of this project. This is
primarily because their theory of the gutter still seems to operate from some spatial foundation,
as do many other theories of the gutter. As such, McCloud’s original theory seemed sufficient to
address for the purposes of this project, although were it to expand, other theories would need to
be addressed at length. Due to various limitations brought about by the very nature of this
project, I regrettably cannot go more into such possibilities here.
In re the light integration of cognitive science research: although many studies do suggest
greater emotional response in human brains to pictures than words, these studies, somewhat
unsurprisingly, have not gone without their critiques. For instance, one critical review covering a
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wide range of studies points to what the authors consider a “negativity bias,” a term to signify the
wide use of negative pictorial stimuli and the noted greater emotional response to negative over
positive stimuli in humans (Olofsson et al.). This, in addition to the aforementioned study by
Schlochtermeier et al., points to the tentative conclusion that pictures necessarily produce
heightened emotional response when compared to words. In seeking further support from the
sciences for my overall theory of comics, such problems and disputes would need to be explored
further. My primary purpose for referencing such scientific research here as been to suggest and
explore the potentiality for its integration with contemporary aesthetics and comics criticism.
Beyond Neil Cohn’s own research, there has been little of such exploration in contemporary
comics studies.
Moreover, I have discussed at length what I consider the nature of the image and text in
comics, and though I have also given attention to such features of comics such as the word
balloon, there are other matters on which I have remained silent. One such area concerns the
panel’s frame. I speak of the text as that which gives form to the image’s sensational
formlessness. But can the panel frame, being a sort of container for the image, not also serve this
function? Of course, what does this mean for my other claim that the frame is but an extension of
the image? I do not wish to delve into the matter here, yet I bring it up so as to indicate one area
deserving further exploration should the present project be expanded upon.
With this project, I have sought to establish the theoretical groundwork for a larger theory
of comics, what I termed in the essay’s introduction as an aesthetics of comics. In this way, I
have hoped to expand the discussion of comics outside of its largely literary and linguistic mold
and into areas of aesthetics and even metaphysics through my exploration on both the image and
text’s nature of being in the comics medium. In short, I hope to have demonstrated the
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potentiality for further study in largely uncharted areas of the critical and theoretical landscape.
Being thus but one stage in potentially larger project, this essay means to provide food for
thought and points of discussion in the hope of expanding comics studies’ current theoretical
framework.
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